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[M]ost Americans [] believe that [their] government is corrupt . . . .  
[Citizens United] has come to represent [a problem] . . . : The people 
have lost faith in their government.  They have lost the faith that their 
government is responsive to them, because they have become 
convinced that their government is more responsive to those who fund 
[congressional] campaigns . . . . 
 —Lawrence Lessig, testifying before Congress1 
 
Outside these walls, the public’s perception is that not only is 
Congress a do-nothing institution, but that it is bought and paid for as 
well. And, in politics, perception is reality, and the perception is that 
it is getting worse, not better. 
—Charles Roemer, testifying before Congress2 
  
The Supreme Court began expressing concern about the appearance of corrupt 
political campaign spending in the early 1970s.  The Court first articulated this 
concern in Buckley v. Valeo,3 stating that the “impact of the appearance of 
corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse 
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” was a concern 
as important as that of actual corruption.4  The Court has held that preventing 
both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption are sufficiently 
important concerns such that restrictions on spending for campaign 
                                                            
 1. Taking Back Our Democracy: Responding to Citizens United and the Rise of Super PACs: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 18 (2012) [hereinafter Taking Back 
Our Democracy Hearing] (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Harvard Law School). 
 2. Id. at 62 (statement of Charles Roemer, former Congressman and Governor of Louisiana). 
 3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 4. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
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communication, which the Court deems “speech,” should be imposed.5  
Although “appearance of corruption” is omnipresent in the Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence,6 this concern receives scant attention compared to actual 
corruption.  Meanwhile, the Court’s narrow definition of corruption yields 
judicial opinions that permit unprecedented amounts of money to support 
political messaging.7 
As campaign spending has escalated, so has the controversy surrounding new 
structures for bundling and spending campaign funds, known as Super Political 
Action Committees (Super PACs).  Because of the influence of Super PACs, the 
number of campaign advertisements—most of them negative—in the past two 
election cycles has increased dramatically.8  Simultaneously, members of the 
media, election law scholars, and watchdog groups have disseminated 
information regarding the political objectives of wealthy donors. The public 
appears to be taking notice.  Polls conducted in the two years leading up to the 
2012 elections reveal that Americans almost unanimously believe that there is 
too much money in political campaigns.9  The polls reveal that Americans 
oppose Super PACs, support a constitutional amendment banning corporate 
political spending, and believe that the current system allows wealthy interests 
to drown out the voice of ordinary citizens.10  Perhaps most importantly, survey 
respondents believe the current system of campaign financing leads to 
corruption, and many claim they are less likely to vote in elections as a result.11 
In 2010, Citizens United v. FEC12 profoundly changed the current campaign 
finance landscape by removing the barrier to unlimited independent spending.13  
Before Citizens United, individuals, but not corporations, could spend unlimited 
sums on independent political advocacy.14  Those contributions could not be 
                                                            
 5. See, e.g., id. at 17 (upholding restrictions on campaign financial contributions, noting that 
“it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged ‘conduct’ of giving or spending 
money ‘arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is 
itself thought to be harmful’” (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968))). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 27 (noting the Court’s concern that appearance of corruption may be as 
dangerous as actual corruption). 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Part III.C.2 (referencing several polls that demonstrate the public’s belief that 
campaign contributions improperly influence political campaigns). 
 10. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 11. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY: SUPER PACS, CORRUPTION, AND 
DEMOCRACY 3 (2012) [hereinafter NATIONAL SURVEY], available at http://www.brennan 
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/CFR/SuperPACs_Corruption_Democracy.pdf. 
 12. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 13. See id. at 365. 
 14. “Independent Expenditures” are those made in support of “a communication expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in cooperation, 
consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s 
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pooled with the money of other individuals.  However, individual contributions 
of less than $5,000 could be combined under the auspices of what is now known 
as a “traditional” Political Action Committee (PAC).15  Citizens United changed 
the law.  A few months after Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit concluded in 
SpeechNow.Org. v. FEC16 that Citizens United had removed the limits on 
individual donations to independent groups.17  This decision led to the birth of 
Super PACs.18  Whereas in the past, traditional PACs could only receive 
donations up to $5,000 per year, after SpeechNow.org, donations to Super PACs 
were unlimited.  According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2012, Super 
PACs spent a record $609 million on independent expenditures and were major 
players in more than a dozen congressional races.19 
Empirical data suggests that the proliferation of money available to influence 
politics undercuts citizens’ sense of political efficacy.20  Political efficacy is 
determined by the responsiveness of government to citizen involvement in 
politics.21  Social scientists note that when citizenry lacks a minimum level of 
political efficacy, members of the public stop participating in politics, either in 
opposition or out of a sense of futility.22  Recent polling data suggests Americans 
                                                            
authorized committee, . . . [its] agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”  11 C.F.R. § 
100.16(a) (2013). 
 15. Terms-&-Resources,-CLEANSLATENOW,-http://www.cleanslatenow.org/terms_and_ 
resources (last visited July 28, 2014).  
 16. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 17. See id. at 694–95. 
 18. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) recognizes Super PACs and Hybrid PACs 
(PACs with non-contribution accounts) as political action committees engaged in uncoordinated 
spending.  Per FEC guidelines, Super and Hybrid PACs must file a “Statement of Organization” 
within ten days of “raising or spending in excess of $1,000 in connection with federal elections.”  
Quick Answers to PAC Questions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
ans/answers_pac.shtml#super_hybrid (last visited July 28, 2014) [hereinafter Quick Answers to 
PAC Questions].  Further, “the committee must submit a letter to identify itself as a Super PAC or 
Hybrid PAC.”  Id. 
 19. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S 
(last visited July 28, 2014). 
 20. See infra Part IV.B (noting that citizens tend to doubt their ability to influence the 
government when they perceive a rise in independent campaign contributions). 
 21. Richard G. Niemi, Stephen C. Craig & Franco Mattei, Measuring Internal Political 
Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1407, 1407-08 (1991); 
Timothy Vercellotti, Reaping Dividends From a Personal Investment in Politics: The Link Between 
Campaign Activism, Election Outcomes, and Political Efficacy 1 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, working 
paper 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902399. 
 22. Albert Bandura, Personal and Collective Efficacy in Human Adaptation and Change, in 
1 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 51, 52 (John G. Adair, David Bélanger, & Kenneth L. 
Dion eds., 1996).  C.f. David Easton & Jack Dennis, The Child’s Acquisition of Regime Norms: 
Political Efficacy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 26, 28 (1967) (stating that individuals are more likely 
to participate in the political process if they have a sense of political efficacy). 
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are responding to a lack of political efficacy by increasingly disengaging with 
the political process.23 
An examination of the 2012 election reveals an interesting pattern: small 
donations were numerous and volunteering was strong, but voting decreased—
not only from 2008 numbers, but from 2004 levels as well.24  At first blush, this 
mixed picture is puzzling.  It is difficult to explain why high-investment 
participation was up while low-investment participation was down.  However, 
certain features of the presidential campaign—and specifically Barack Obama’s 
campaign tactics—may explain the anomaly.  The Obama campaign’s ability to 
bolster political efficacy through various channels of communication—
including, most notably, the Internet—paid dividends in 2008.25  In particular, 
the campaign’s slogans involved a focus on the individual voter and the power 
of the message’s recipient to make a difference in the election.26  The Obama 
campaign was rewarded for its efforts with record numbers of volunteers and 
small donations.27 
Obama benefitted from similar direct pleas for support in 2012.  In a 
substantially closer race, Obama needed to up the ante in his turn-out-the-vote 
strategy.28  On Election Day 2012, some hailed the Democrats’ turnout efforts 
                                                            
 23. See NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 11, at 3 (finding Americans are less likely to vote 
because of the rise of Super PAC spending).  See also Todd Paulson & David Schultz, Bucking 
Buckley: Voter Attitudes, Tobacco Money, and Campaign Contribution Corruption in Minnesota 
Politics, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 449, 469–70 (1998) (noting the major impact that even a 
small number of citizens choosing not to vote can have on the political process). 
 24. See Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-analysis/voter-
turnout/ (last visited July 28, 2014) (noting that fifty-nine percent of eligible voters participated in 
the 2012 election, whereas sixty-one percent of that population voted in 2004). 
 25. See Beth Fouhy, 2012 Campaign: Obama, Romney Volunteers Hope To Make The 
Difference In November, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2012/07/03/2012-campaign-obama-romney_n_1647029.html. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Jose Antonio Vargas, Obama Raised Half a Billion Online, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2008, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/20/obama_raised_half_a_billion_on.html-(noting 
that of the 6.5 million online donations to the 2008 Obama campaign, 6 million were in increments 
of $100 or less, and that the campaign was very “volunteer-centric”).  The Pew Research Center 
reported that Obama’s 2008 strategy resulted in a surge of both monetary donations and volunteer 
hours.  Notably, “young people provided not only their votes but also many enthusiastic campaign 
volunteers. Some may have helped persuade parents and older relatives to consider Obama’s 
candidacy.  And far more young people than older voters reported attending a campaign event while 
nearly one-in-ten donated money to a presidential candidate.”  Scott Keeter, Juliana Horowitz & 
Alec Tyson, Young Voters in the 2008 Election, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 13, 2008), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/11/13/young-voters-in-the-2008-election/.  The donations alone 
were an accomplishment for the Obama campaign, given that most of Obama’s supporters were 
under thirty.  See id. (noting sixty-six percent of the youth vote went to Obama). 
 28. Robert Butler, US Election History: Razor-Thin Finish In 2012 Would Be Far From 
Nation’s First, THEPRESIDENCY (Nov. 7, 2012), http://thepresidency.us/2012/11/us-election-
history-razor-thin-finish-in-2012-would-be-far-from-nations-first/.  See also Lucy Madison, In 
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as historic.29  Obama’s Republican challenger, Mitt Romney responded by 
ramping up turn-out efforts.  Yet, in spite of the proven success of direct appeals, 
after overall voter numbers were calculated, it became clear that both 
Democratic and Republican voter participation was down.30  Polling of self-
identified non-voters revealed fifty-four percent believed the political process 
was corrupt.31 
Although one should not draw conclusions based upon this data, the numbers 
imply a correlation between perceptions of corruption and depressed voter 
turnout.  Further, in light of the 2008 Obama campaign’s success in drawing out 
volunteers, donors, and voters, the lower numbers from 2012 may portend a 
more substantial decline in future elections.  Indeed, members of the American 
public increasingly may decide not to participate in politics as their discontent 
with “big money”32 in politics grows.33  Ultimately, the appearance of corruption 
stemming from the rise of Super PACs and similar campaign finance bundling 
groups could usher in a new era of political apathy and citizen disengagement. 
Part I of this Article provides background on campaign finance law, 
highlighting the Supreme Court’s recent Citizens United decision that makes the 
accumulation of large pools of money for candidate and issue advertisements 
possible.  Part I explains the Court’s acceptance of citizen perceptions of 
corruption as a legitimate basis for regulating campaign communication, but 
notes the Court has failed to elaborate on or use this interest as a determining 
                                                            
Last Days of Campaign, a Final Push to Get Out the Vote, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2013, 5:21 PM), 
http://cbsnews.com/news/in-last-days-of-campaign-a-final-push-to-get-out-the-vote/. 
 29. See, e.g., Rebecca Sinderbrand, Analysis: Obama Won with a Better Ground Game, CNN 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/analysis-why-obama-won/ 
(noting that Obama’s 2012 campaign “made history”).  The predicted numbers and make-up of 
polling place no-shows were weighted against Obama, making the get-out-the-vote ground game 
particularly important for his campaign.  See Susan Page, Why 90 Million Americans Won’t Vote 
in November, USA TODAY (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/politics/story/2012-08-15/non-voters-obama-romney/57055184/ (noting that, in advance of 
the 2012 election, two-thirds of voters classified as “unlikely to participate” in 2012 supported 
Obama in 2008). 
 30. CURTIS GANS, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., 2012 ELECTION TURNOUT DIPS BELOW 2008 
AND 2004 LEVELS: NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS INCREASES BY EIGHT MILLION, FIVE MILLION 
FEWER VOTES CAST 1 (2012), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ 
2012%20Voter%20Turnout%20Full%20Report.pdf. 
 31. Susan Page, The No Votes: 90 Million; That’s How Many Americans Could Vote in 
November but Likely Won’t.  They’re Busy, Fed Up, Disillusioned.  Lisa Goicochea, 19, is One of 
Them., USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 2012, at A1. 
 32. The term “big money” is often used by opponents of the current campaign finance laws 
and climate.  See, e.g.,  Money in Politics, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/site/ 
pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4764307 (last visited July 28, 2014) (suggesting that the “power of 
big money” can be challenged by “small donor contributions and public funds,” and noting that 
“big money” became a greater problem following Citizens United). 
 33. See Philip B. Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 323, 328–
29 (1996) (recognizing that the potential for corruption inherent in a system that allows large 
campaign contributions can lead to cynicism among voters). 
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factor in its decisions.  Part II explains how Citizens United triggered a series of 
events, including the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org and the 
subsequent birth of the Super PAC, which increased the potential for bundling 
contributions.  Part II illustrates the effect of Super PACs and other financing 
structures by citing data on the amount of independent money spent during the 
most recent presidential election.  Part III illustrates how developments in 
campaign financing influenced the appearance of corruption.  Additionally, Part 
III includes extensive discussion of polling data evincing Americans’ distrust of 
the political election process and the government generally.  Part IV discusses 
implications of polling data that reveal widespread perceptions of campaign 
corruption.  This Part begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s adoption 
of appearance of corruption as a compelling concern, and illustrates how the 
Court considered the issue in past opinions.  Further, Part IV explains how 
perceptions of corruption affect voters’ sense of political efficacy, thereby 
threatening democracy.  Finally, Part V analyzes citizen involvement in the 2012 
political election, both as a function of donations and volunteerism and in terms 
of voter turnout.  In particular, Part V focuses on the 2012 Obama campaign’s 
strategy, arguing that the 2012 election cycle simultaneously illustrates the 
importance of political efficacy while foreshadowing problems for future 
elections. 
I.  A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE “APPEARANCE 
OF CORRUPTION” 
Public suspicion regarding the role of money in politics dates back to colonial 
times.  Even the revered George Washington was accused of exploiting money 
for political gain.34  Toward the close of the nineteenth century, direct 
contributions from corporate treasuries provided William McKinley’s 
Republican campaign a $16 million to $600,000 edge over Democrat William 
                                                            
 34. See R.T. BARTON, THE FIRST ELECTION OF WASHINGTON TO THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 
123–24 (1891).  It is largely believed that Washington engaged in irregular campaign spending, 
with one historian noting that Washington spent campaign money on more than a quart of rum, 
beer, and hard cider per voter during his campaign.  Id. at 124.  Historian R. T. Barton noted that 
after the 1757 election, the House of Burgesses passed a law providing that: 
[N]o one should be qualified to hold a seat in that house, who should, “before his election, 
either himself or by any other person or persons on his behalf and at his charge, directly 
or indirectly give, present or allow any person or persons having voice or vote in such 
election any money, meat, drink, entertainment or provision, or make any present, gift, 
reward, or entertainment, &c., &c., in order to be elected.” . . . [H]ad [the law] been in 
force prior to [Washington’s] election[,] he would certainly have been ineligible to his 
seat. . . . As a law-abiding citizen it is to be presumed that [after the law’s passage,] meat 
and drink, except in the ordinary way of hospitality, were not among the means resorted 
to by Washington and his friends to secure popular favor. 
Id.  See also John Morgan & Felix Várdy, On the Buyability of Voting Bodies, 23 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 260, 260 (2011) (discussing Washington’s distribution of alcohol in exchange for votes). 
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Jennings Bryan.35  In the face of widespread public opposition to McKinley’s 
campaign financing, Theodore Roosevelt publicly opposed such practices.36  
Outrage was so significant that Roosevelt called for, and Congress passed, the 
first major campaign-finance reform law.  The Tillman Act of 1907 banned all 
contributions by corporations to any federal political campaign for any political 
purpose.37  The sponsor of the bill, Senator Benjamin Tillman, remarked that it 
was a “sad thought that the Senate is discredited by the people of the United 
States as being a body more or less corruptible or corrupted.”38  Forty years after 
the passage of the Tillman Act, the Taft-Hartley Act “extended the ban on 
corporate donations to labor unions.”39  Early campaign finance legislation 
reveals political actors have long worried about how campaign donations and 
outside spending appears to their constituents. 
A.  Pre-Citizens United 
The modern era of campaign finance law dates to the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter 
Carriers.40  In that case, the Court held that federal employees were prohibited 
from taking formal positions in political parties or running for office on partisan 
political tickets.41  The Court stated that “it is not only important that the 
Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is 
also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the 
                                                            
 35. See Jack Beatty, A Sisyphean History of Campaign Finance Reform, ATLANTIC, July 
2007, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/07/a-sisyphean-history-of-campaign-
finance-reform/306066/.  See also Big Money and Politics, NPR (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter Big 
Money and Politics], http://www.npr.org/news/specials/democracy/index.html. 
 36. Beatty, supra note 35 (discussing how the “[p]ublic recoil against the corruption of 
politics by business led McKinley’s successor, Theodore Roosevelt, to act”).  In his 1905 State of 
the Union address, Roosevelt condemned the perception that the dollar speaks louder than the vote, 
stating that there is: “[n]o enemy of free government more dangerous and none so insidious as the 
corruption of the electorate.”  President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Message (Dec. 5, 
1905), available at http://theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/speeches/sotu5.pdf.  Roosevelt 
subsequently suffered a major crisis of public confidence “[w]hen it was revealed that railroad and 
oil companies provided 75 percent of [his] campaign funds during the 1904 presidential election.”  
Big Money and Politics, supra note 35. 
 37. Beatty, supra note 35. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). 
 41. Id. at 580–81.  The case arose when a group of federal employees and local party 
committees challenged a Hatch Act provision that banned federal employees from “engag[ing] in 
political activity . . . in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an 
individual employed or holding office in the Government of the United States or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2012).  This was not the first Supreme Court 
case to challenge the Hatch Act.  See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 
145 (1947) (upholding the statute). 
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system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous 
extent.”42  Importantly, this decision reflected the Court’s understanding that an 
important aspect of democratic politics is public perception of the fairness of the 
process. 
One year prior to the National Ass’n of Letter Carriers decision, Congress 
amended the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).43  The FECA 
Amendments limited certain political contributions and expenditures, imposed 
disclosure requirements on political committees that receive contributions and 
on individuals and groups who made contributions, developed public financing 
programs for Presidential elections, and created the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) to administer the new requirements.44  Predictably, the 
amendments were challenged, and in 1976, the Court handed down its opinion 
in Buckley.  The Buckley appellants argued that limiting the use of money for 
political purposes constituted an impermissible restriction of speech, because, in 
their view, the modern political environment required monetary expenditures to 
make meaningful political communications.45  The appellees countered that the 
regulations advanced several important governmental interests, including: (1) 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption; (2) “equaliz[ing] the 
relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections;” and (3) 
tempering dramatic increases in the costs of political campaigns with the goal of 
encouraging political candidates lacking substantial sums of money to 
participate in the political process.46  Ultimately, the Buckley Court sustained 
FECA’s individual contribution limits, disclosure provision, and public 
financing scheme, but it found the expenditure limitations “constitutionally 
infirm.”47  In upholding limitations on direct contributions, the Court determined 
that Congress’ interest in preventing not only actual corruption, but also the 
appearance of corruption, was justified.  The Court explained that “Congress 
could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper 
influence ‘is . . . critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative 
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”48  The Buckley Court 
referred to the Government interest in combating the appearance or perception 
of corruption engendered by large campaign contributions as having “almost 
equal” importance as combatting actual corruption.49 
                                                            
 42. Id. at 565. 
 43. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 44. Id. at 5–12. 
 45. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1975) (per curiam). 
 46. Id. at 25–26. 
 47. Id. at 143. 
 48. Id. at 27 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 
548, 565 (1973)). 
 49. Id. at 27. 
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Although the Buckley Court found that direct contributions could pose a threat 
to the legitimacy of elections, it did not regard independent expenditures as 
posing the same threat.50  The Court worried about limiting political speech 
without a sufficiently compelling reason to do so.51  In finding the expenditure 
limitations constitutionally infirm, the Court noted that limiting spending 
“necessarily reduces the quantity of expression . . . because virtually every 
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure 
of money.”52  Moreover, the Court asserted that “[t]he First Amendment’s 
protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly 
be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public 
discussion.”53  Finally, the Court decided there is nothing “invidious, improper, 
or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate’s 
message to the electorate.”54  In so holding, the Court determined that 
unrestricted independent spending on political messaging does not create the 
appearance of corruption.55  Buckley established that the only constitutionally 
acceptable rationale for campaign finance regulation was to combat corruption 
or the appearance of corruption; neither leveling the playing field nor any other 
rationale would suffice.56 
                                                            
 50. See id. at 44–51 (finding that the justifications for other limitations did not support 
limiting individual expenditures).  The Court concluded that “the weighty interests served by 
restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the 
limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.”  Id. at 
29.  The Court also held that the $5,000 limit on contributions by political committees enhanced 
the opportunity of association “of bona fide groups to participate in the election process, and the 
registration, contribution, and candidate conditions serve the permissible purpose of preventing 
individuals from evading the applicable contribution limitations by labeling themselves 
committees.”  Id. at 35–36.  Finally, the Court noted that the $25,000 limitation on total 
contributions during any calendar year was constitutional even though it did impose a restriction 
on “the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by 
means of financial support[,]” because the restraint serves “to prevent evasion of the $1,000 
contribution limitation” and is thus no more than a corollary to the individual limitation.  Id. at 38.  
The Buckley Court held that, following amendments in 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) limited expenditures by individuals or groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate” 
to “$1,000 to any single candidate per election . . . .”  Id. at 7. 
 51. See id. at 18–19 (noting the real dangers to freedom of speech posed by campaign 
spending restrictions).  The Court characterized expenditure limitations as restricting the quantity 
of speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.  Id. at 18. 
 52. Id. at 19. 
 53. Id. at 49. 
 54. Id. at 56. 
 55. Daniel R. Ortiz, Recovering the Individual in Politics, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
263, 272 (2012) (stating that Buckley made clear that regulation of independent expenditures to 
“avoid the appearance of corruption” is not a legitimate interest). 
 56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.  The Court explicitly rejected the goal of “equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”  Id.  The Court 
explained that there is no precedent in support of the proposition that “the First Amendment permits 
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In October 1989, the Court heard arguments for Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce.57  The Austin plaintiffs challenged a Michigan statute that 
prohibited non-media corporations from using general treasury funds for 
independent expenditures in state election campaigns.58  The Court held the 
statute was constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs because it was narrowly 
tailored and served a compelling state interest, thus satisfying a strict scrutiny 
analysis.59  The Court believed Michigan had a compelling interest in “the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”60  The 
Court was concerned that corporations would gain an unfair advantage in the 
political arena.61  The Austin Court’s perspective relates to the goal of 
safeguarding First Amendment values by preserving space for individuals to 
create meaningful and perceptible political speech.62 According to the Austin 
Court, the numerous advantages enjoyed by corporations “not only allow 
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit 
them to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an 
unfair advantage in the political marketplace.’”
130 
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,63 the Court upheld Missouri’s 
$1,075 funding limit to candidates for state wide office.64  Justice Souter, writing 
for the Court, emphasized evidence showing Missouri residents perceived a need 
for limits.  He wrote “although majority votes do not, as such, defeat First 
Amendment protections, the statewide vote on [the funding limit bill] certainly 
attested to the perception relied upon here: ‘[a]n overwhelming 74 percent of the 
voters of Missouri determined that contribution limits are necessary to combat 
corruption and the appearance thereof.’”65  The opinion cited newspaper stories 
                                                            
Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to enhance 
the relative voice of other segments of our society.”  Id. at 49 n.55. 
 57. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 58. Id. at 654. 
 59. Id. at 655. 
 60. Id. at 660 (citation omitted).  Austin was not the first occasion in which the Court 
identified both corruption and the appearance of corruption as the twin concerns of campaign 
finance legislation.  Prior to Austin, the Court held in FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) that “preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption 
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting 
campaign finances.” 
 61. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 64. Id. at 381–83, 397–98. 
 65. Id. at 394. 
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and editorials arguing that wealthy interests were controlling Missouri politics.66  
Justice Souter’s examples of media accounts were notable, not because they 
demonstrated actual corruption, but because they evinced the belief among 
Missouri residents that money had a corrupting influence. 
In spite of the Austin and Shrink Missouri holdings, lawmakers heard a call 
for more comprehensive campaign finance reforms.  In 2002, Congress passed 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)—or the McCain-Feingold Act.67  
BCRA was a Congressional attempt to close “loopholes” in FECA and other 
portions of the United States Code in order “to purge national politics of what is 
conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign 
contributions.”68  BCRA was challenged in the 2003 case, McConnell v. FEC.69  
The McConnell Court found limits on electioneering communications 
permissible, citing concern for the “‘eroding of public confidence in the electoral 
process through the appearance of corruption.’”70  The McConnell Court also 
referred to the compelling interest in preventing both actual corruption and the 
appearance of corruption.71  The Court’s special emphasis on the appearance of 
corruption suggested growing concern about the potential for citizens to 
disengage with the political process as well as a focus on the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions. 
                                                            
 66. Id. at 393.  Justice Souter also noted that Missouri previously adopted campaign finance 
limits through a ballot proposition that received seventy-four percent approval from voters.  Id. at 
394. 
 67. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 68. United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
(UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957) (emphasis added).  See generally 81 Stat. at 116 (providing 
various forms of campaign finance reform). 
 69. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) formed the basis for 
this decision.  In McConnell, the Court found that FECA regulated donations ‘“made by any person 
for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,’ but did not regulate donations made 
‘solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections.”’  Id. at 122 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 
431(8)(A)(i) (2012)).  As a result, prior to BCRA’s enactment, corporations, unions, and even 
wealthy individuals “who had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal 
candidates” could contribute “nonfederal money” (also known as “soft money”) to political parties 
in order to influence state or local elections.  Id. at 123.  “[S]uch soft money contributions [were] 
designed to gain access to federal candidates” and were frequently “solicited by the candidates 
themselves.”  Id. at 125.  The McConnell Court noted that “[t]he solicitation, transfer, and use of 
soft money thus enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA’s limitations on the source 
and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections.”  Id. at 126. 
 70. Id. at 136. (citing FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).  An 
“electioneering communication” is a “broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which . . . refers 
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . . [and] is made within . . . sixty days before a 
general, special, or runoff election . . . or thirty days before a primary or preference election.”  2 
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)). 
 71. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 96. 
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B.  Citizens United 
When the Citizens United opinion was handed down, it set off a storm of 
controversy and commentary from lawmakers, political pundits, scholars, and 
the American public.  The decision involved the question of whether Citizens 
United, a not-for-profit advocacy group, could advertise and freely distribute a 
political documentary titled Hillary: The Movie during the thirty-day period 
leading up to an election.72  Both the advertisements for the movie and the movie 
itself were highly critical of Hillary Clinton and made the case that she was unfit 
to serve as United States president.73  Because Citizens United received 
corporate funding, federal law forbade Citizens United from broadcasting the 
film.74  The Citizens United trial court denied the group’s request for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, basing its decision upon existing campaign finance laws.75 
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court overturned Austin,76 the portion of 
McConnell that restricted independent corporate expenditures,77 and section 203 
of BCRA as codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b).78  In particular, Citizens United 
invalidated laws forbidding corporations and unions from using general treasury 
funds for “electioneering communication,” political advocacy transmitted by 
“broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” in the period leading up to a 
federal election.79  After the ruling, no state could limit the amount of money 
corporations or unions poured into advertising for or against issues or candidates 
in the run-up to an election.80 
                                                            
 72. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–21 (2010). 
 73. Id. at 325.  Citizens United wanted to promote and make available an on-demand version 
of the film.  Id. at 320.  The group also wanted to pay for two ten-second and one thirty-second 
advertisements for the film.  Id.  “Each ad [was to] include[] a short (and . . . pejorative) statement 
about Senator Clinton, followed by the name of the movie and the movie’s [w]ebsite address.”  Id. 
at 320. 
 74. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (prohibiting corporate expenditures for certain political 
campaigns).  See also supra note 70 (defining “electioneering communication”). 
 75. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam) 
(denying Citizens United’s request for a preliminary injunction).  The court held that § 441b was 
facially constitutional under McConnell, and that it was constitutional as applied to Hillary because 
the film was “susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate that Senator Clinton 
is unfit for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary Clinton 
world, and that viewers should vote against her.”  Id. at 279–80. 
 76. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 77. Id. at 366. 
 78. Id. at 365. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Much is made of the fact that Citizens United provided the Court many avenues by which 
the Court could decide the question on narrow grounds in the group’s arguments.  See, e.g., Glen 
M. Vogel, Clinton, Campaigns, and Corporate Expenditures: The Supreme Court’s Recent 
Decision in Citizen’s United and its Impact on Corporate Political Influence, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 183, 200 (2012) (noting that Citizens United offered alternate grounds for the Court to make 
its decision). 
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In striking down previous corporate spending limits, the Citizens United Court 
asserted that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, 
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”81  Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court, decisively rejected Austin’s distortion rationale, 
finding that interest “unconvincing and insufficient.”82  Importantly, Kennedy 
asserted that even the appearance of influence from such donations does not 
cause the citizenry to lose faith in the election process.83  The only evidence 
Kennedy provided for this supposition was Kennedy’s own conclusion that 
“[t]he fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to 
try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence 
over elected officials.”84  Confident that his logic would guide voter behavior, 
Kennedy concluded that unlimited corporate spending would not adversely 
affect citizen participation in elections.85 
In response to the majority’s opinion, Justice Stevens penned a partial dissent 
in which he questioned virtually all of Kennedy’s assumptions.  Stevens noted 
that the majority ignored the fundamental concerns underlying the legislature’s 
and the Court’s previous decisions to limit corporate spending in the electoral 
process.86  Stevens went on to assert: 
A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent 
members believe laws are being bought and sold.  At stake in the 
legislative efforts to address this threat is therefore not only the 
legitimacy and quality of Government but also the public’s faith 
therein, not only “the capacity of this democracy to represent its 
constituents [but also] the confidence of its citizens in their capacity 
to govern themselves . . . .”87 
                                                            
 81. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 82. Id. at 366. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 360. 
 85. Id.  See also Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 581, 609 (2011) (highlighting “the majority’s unsupported empirical statement—
apparently for all types of elections and any identity of speaker—that independent spending can 
never cause voters to ‘lose faith in our democracy’”).  In spite of Kennedy’s assertion, 
commentators argue that the opinion purports to make speech available for all, but actually hinders 
participation by the public.  For example, Monica Youn proposes that the opinion establishes a 
“‘source-blind’ approach to the regulation of money in politics that forbids the state from 
differentiating among different sources of political spending . . . . Under [this] fully commodified 
conception of speech, speakers drop out of the picture.”  Monica Youn, First Amendment Fault 
Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 137 (2011). 
 86. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 450, 453 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S., 449, 507 (2007) (Souter, 
J., dissenting)). 
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Stevens’ dissent was notable in part because it explicitly contemplated the 
damage appearance of corruption could cause.  He found the implications and 
potential effects of Citizens United deeply troubling. 
He was not alone.  The Citizens United opinion received immediate and wide-
spread media coverage.  Scholarly discussion and commentary flourished, as did 
far-reaching media coverage.  For example, Bill Moyers interviewed Monica 
Youn and Zephyr Teachout on PBS,88 a preliminary New York Times article 
received more than 2,000 posted comments,89 and a series of articles and a spate 
of editorials followed the initial article.90  Other widely read news outlets and 
blogs published stories and opinion pieces on the decision, including the Wall 
Street Journal, the Washington Post, Politico, Slate, USA Today, and the 
Huffington Post.91  Television outlets of all political stripes also weighed in.92  
                                                            
 88. See Free Speech for Corporations, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/01292010/ 
profile2.html (last updated Jan. 29, 2010). 
 89. See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all. 
 90. See, e.g., Matt Bai, How Did Political Money Get This Loud?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 
22, 2012, at 14; Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A30; 
Editorial, The Supreme Court Acts: Justices Assert Federal Power on Immigration and Refuse to 
Revisit the Citizens United Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A22; Editorial, When Other 
Voices Are Drowned Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, at A26. 
 91. See, e.g., Daniel Henninger, Op-Ed., The Rage Against Citizens United, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
28, 2010, at A15; Philip Rucker, The Film that Cracked the Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at 
C8; Bradley Smith, The Incumbent’s Bane: Citizens United and the 2010 Election, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 25, 2011, at A15; Joan Biskupic & Fredreka Schouten, Supreme Court Rolls Back Campaign 
Spending Limits, USA TODAY (Jan 21, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/washington/judicial/2010-01-21-campaign-spending-supreme-court_N.htm; John C. Coates 
& Taylor Lincoln, Fulfilling the Promise of ‘Citizens United’, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fulfilling-the-promise-of-citizensunited/2011/09/02/-
gIQAa4np7J_story.html; Dan Eggen, Citizens United Challenges the Strident Side of Supreme 
Court Ruling, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033104028.html; Richard L. Hasen, Money 
Grubbers, SLATE (Jan, 21, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2010/01/money_grubbers.html; Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie, SLATE 
(Mar. 9, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/03/ 
the_supreme_court_s_citizens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_campaign_spendin
g_.html; Ashby Jones, What Will Citizens United Do to the 2010 Election Cycle?, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:59 PM),  http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/21/what-will-citizens-united-
do-to-the-2010-election-cycle/; Jason Linkins, The Supreme Court’s Citizen United Decision is 
Terrifying, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/ 
01/21/the-supreme-courts-citize_n_432127.html; Deborah Tedford, Supreme Court Rips Up 
Campaign Finance Laws, NPR (Jan 21, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=122805666. 
 92. See, e.g., Ken Klukowski, Founding Fathers Smiling After Supreme Court Campaign 
Finance Ruling, FOXNEWS (Jan 22, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/01/22/ken-
klukowski-supreme-court-amendment-mccain-feingold/; The Rachel Maddow Show: Interview 
with Ilya Shapiro (MSNBC television broadcast July 23, 2012), available at 
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CNN analyst and New Yorker contributor Jeffrey Toobin wrote a detailed 
analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ strategy regarding the opinion.93  Other 
authors, including Bill Moyers and Lawrence Lessig, wrote books focusing on 
the opinion, most of which are unwaveringly critical of the decision and 
pessimistic about its short and long-term effects.94 
C.  The Supreme Court Reaffirms Citizens United 
In June 2012, a short time after the Citizens United decision, the Court 
reaffirmed the holding in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock,95 a per 
curiam, 5-4 decision.  American Tradition summarily reversed a decision of the 
Montana Supreme Court upholding the state’s existing restrictions on corporate 
political spending.96  The Montana court had ruled that the state’s distinctive 
history and characteristics warranted a departure from the principles announced 
in Citizens United.97  Despite numerous amicus briefs containing testimonials 
about the dangers of unchecked corporate spending on political advocacy,98 the 
American Tradition majority emphatically reaffirmed its earlier position.  The 
brief opinion states that, “[t]he question presented in this case is whether the 
holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law.  There can be no 
serious doubt that it does. . . . Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment 
below either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully 
distinguish that case.”99 
As with Citizens United, media coverage on the topic of corporate electoral 
spending was extensive, both leading up to and following the American 
Tradition decision.  After the decision, a flood of articles addressed a range of 
issues, from the changing role of the Roberts Court to the implications for First 
                                                            
http://www.cato.org/multimedia/video-highlights/ilya-shapiro-citizens-united-msnbcs-rachel-
maddow-show. 
 93. See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the 
Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36–47 (discussing Roberts’ acts and 
intention to overturn decades-old campaign finance precedent). 
 94. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE: WHY THEY HAVE 
MORE RIGHTS THAN YOU DO AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2012); THOM HARTMANN, 
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME “PEOPLE”—AND YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 
(2d ed. 2010); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND 
A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED (Monica Youn ed., 2011). 
 95. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam). 
 96. Id. at 2491. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: Citizens United Solidified, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 
2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/opinion-recap-citizens-united-solidified/ 
(noting that “[t]he brevity of the . . . opinion . . . overruling the Montana Supreme Court suggested 
. . . the [Court was] . . . unmoved by . . . briefs urging the Court to reconsider [Citizens United] in 
the wake of the flood of money going into races [in 2012]”). 
 99. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491. 
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Amendment jurisprudence; publications also addressed the impact on corporate 
governance, theory, and tax law.100  Very little commentary focused on the 
perceptions of the American voter.101  Given the prominence of the “appearance 
of corruption” issue in Citizens United and earlier campaign finance decisions, 
this omission is surprising.  How corrupt the process appears was a concern 
prominently featured in every previous Supreme Court campaign finance 
opinion, dating back to pre-Buckley days.  This “appearance” concern is 
routinely discussed in tandem with “actual” corruption.102 
D.  The D.C. Circuit Weighs In 
Two months after Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit decided 
SpeechNow.org.103  SpeechNow.org addressed whether the federal government 
may require an unincorporated association that makes only independent 
expenditures to register as a political committee subject to various requirements 
and restrictions.104  The SpeechNow.org court noted that the committee in 
                                                            
 100. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Declines to Revisit Its Citizens United Decision, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A14; Seth Cline, Supreme Court Considering Case that Defies Citizens 
United Ruling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 15, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
articles/2012/06/15/supreme-court-considering-case-that-defies-citizens-united-ruling; Seth Cline, 
Supreme Court Re-Affirms Citizens United, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 25, 2012),  
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/06/25/supreme-court-re-affirms-citizens-united; 
Michael Doyle, Citizens United Stands; No Exceptions for States, SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2012, 
8:31 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2018532177_scotuscampaign26.html; Josh Levs 
& Bill Mears, Supreme Court Refuses to Reconsider Campaign Finance Controversy, CNN (June 
26, 2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/25/politics/scotus-campaign-finance/ 
index.html; Peter Overby, Supreme Court Says Montana Cannot Ignore ‘Citizens United’ Ruling, 
NPR (June 25, 2012, 12:16 PM),    http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/06/25/155707295/ 
supreme-court-says-montana-cannot-ignore-citizens-united-ruling; Amanda Terkel, Montana 
Nonpartisan Judicial Elections System Struck Down by Appeals Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 
18, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/18/montanas-ban-political-
endorsements-judicial_n_1895318.html?utm_hp_ref=politics; Rachel Weiner, Supreme Court’s 
Montana Decision Strengthens Citizens United, WASH. POST (June 25, 2012, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/supreme-courts-montana-decision-
strengthens-citizens-united/2012/06/25/gJQA8Vln1V_blog.html. 
 101. But see Robert F. Bauer, The Varieties of Corruption and the Problem of Appearance: A 
Response to Professor Samaha, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 91, 95 (2012) (addressing “perceived 
corruption”); Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 
1599–1619 (2012) (focusing on appearance of corruption). 
 102. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (per curiam) (calling actual corruption 
“quid pro quo” while also discussing appearance of corruption). 
 103. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 104. According to FECA, a “political committee” is “‘any committee, club, association, or 
other group of persons’ that receives contributions of more than $1000 in a year or makes 
expenditures of more than $1000 in a year.’”  Id. at 691 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2012)).  See 
also id. (explaining that a “political committee” is subject to the $5,000 per year limit on 
contributions, under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(c), as well as the total individual biennial aggregate limit 
of $69,900 pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)). 
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question proposed to engage exclusively in independent expenditures and said: 
“[b]ecause of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Citizens United], the 
analysis is straightforward . . . .  [T]he government has no anti-corruption interest 
in limiting independent expenditures.”105  Previously, as the SpeechNow.org 
court pointed out, the “Court concluded that limiting the government’s 
anticorruption interest to preventing quid pro quo [sic] was a ‘crabbed view of 
corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption’ that ‘ignores 
precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising.’”106  The 
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the Citizens United Court had “retracted this 
view of the government’s interest.”107  After concluding that the Supreme Court 
had rescinded its prior commitment to addressing broader corruption concerns, 
the SpeechNow.org court had no choice but to lift restrictions on independent 
expenditure committees.108  This holding has important implications for the 
evolution of new forms of political action committees and similar non-profit 
political advocacy groups. 
II.  AFTER CITIZENS UNITED: THE RISE OF THE SUPER PAC 
Although the direct impact on corporate spending patterns remains unclear, 
there is no question that the campaign finance landscape changed dramatically 
following Citizens United.  In the 2008 presidential election, total spending by 
outside organizations equaled $301.6 million.109  In the 2012 presidential 
election cycle, estimated spending by independent groups rose to $652.8 
million.110  Total independent spending for the 2012 election cycle was more 
than $1.3 billion.111  Although Citizens United led to an increase in independent 
spending, only a small amount of that spending is attributable to direct corporate 
spending.112  Direct corporate expenditures are tempered by fear of negative 
                                                            
 105. 599 F.3d at 692–93, 695. 
 106. Id. at 694 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 696. 
 109. Evan Mackinder, Ten Weeks Out From Election Day, Outside Spending Exceeds 2008 
Total, OPENSECRETS (Sept. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/09/ten-
weeks-out-from-election-day-out.html.  See also Press Release, Federal Election Commission, 
2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized: Receipts Nearly Double 2004 Total 
(June 8, 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml 
(reporting that “[i]ndividuals, parties and other groups spent $168.8 million independently 
advocating the election or defeat of presidential candidates during the 2008 campaign”). 
 110. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Independent Expenditures, OPENSECRETS, http://www.open 
secrets.org/pres12/indexp.php (last visited July 30, 2014). 
 111. Follow the Unlimited Money, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://reporting.sunlight 
foundation.com/outside-spending/overview/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2013, 9:34 PM). 
 112. Taking Back Our Democracy Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Ilya Shapiro, 
Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute). 
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publicity from flagrant political spending.113  Rather than spawning a rash of 
direct independent spending by corporations, the decision led to a series of Court 
decisions that opened the door to new mechanisms for bundling funds.  One 
particularly prominent new structure is the Super PAC.  Super PACs are 
campaign finance game-changers.114  Before Citizens United, individuals, but 
not corporations, could spend unlimited funds on independent advertising 
directly supporting or opposing candidates.115  However, that money had to be 
spent by the individual directly rather than pooled with the money of others.116  
Before Citizens United, these PACs were also banned from accepting corporate 
or union funds.  After Citizens United, lower courts had no choice but to 
conclude that the Court’s previous intent to restrict corporate political speech 
through spending had shifted. 
Before SpeechNow.org, the only existing PACs were those receiving or 
spending $1,000 or more to influence political elections.117  Donations to PACs 
were capped at $5,000 per year.118  SpeechNow.org removed all limits on how 
much individuals could donate to a Super PAC.119  Moreover, before Citizens 
United allowed PACs to aggregate unlimited amounts of wealth from various 
sources, an individual who wanted to spend money on advertising for federal 
elections was required to own her ads by including a statement “paid for by 
________.”  Another alternative was contributing to a so-called “527 
organization” (named for a provision in the tax code) that was not technically a 
PAC.120  However, tax scholars debated whether 527 organizations could legally 
                                                            
 113. Id. (noting that companies “actually spend very little money on political advertising, 
partly because it’s more effective to spend money on lobbying but more importantly, why would 
they want to alienate half of their customers?”).  In the spring of 2012, companies faced a record 
number of shareholder demands for disclosures regarding corporate campaign spending.  Fredreka 
Schouten, Activists Pressure Corporations to Disclose Political Spending, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 
2012, at 5A.  As a result, a number of prominent companies cut ties with advocacy groups affiliated 
with controversial positions.  Id. 
 114. But see Justin Elliott, Is Citizens United Just Misunderstood?, SALON (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:08 
PM),-http://www.salon.com/2012/01/18/is_citizens_united_just_misunderstood/singleton/ 
(defending the Citizens United decision by suggesting methods such as taxation or antitrust laws 
are more appropriate for limiting corporate influence on elections than restrictions on a 
corporation’s freedom of speech). 
 115. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (stating that at the time of the 
decision, “wealthy individuals and unincorporated associations [could] spend unlimited amounts 
on independent expenditures”). 
 116. See id. (stating that only “disfavored associations of citizens” in a corporate form were 
penalized by the expenditure bans). 
 117. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Exemption Requirements–Political Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-
Non-Profits/Political-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Political-Organizations-(last 
updated Mar. 12, 2014). 
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take unlimited amounts of money from individuals.121  The lack of clarity about 
the status of 527s as appropriate vehicles for individual contributions made 
many would-be political financiers nervous, but after Citizens United lifted 
restrictions on independent expenditures, an individual or entity could clearly 
donate unlimited amounts of money to a PAC to communicate political 
messages.122 
Donations also may be bundled and spent for political advocacy through 
501(c)(4) organizations (named for the tax code provision under which they 
fall), known as Qualified Nonprofit Corporations (QNCs), which may not donate 
to political campaigns or parties directly and have no donor-disclosure 
obligations.123  An important distinction between Super PACs and QNCs is that 
the latter may not accept donations from corporate or labor union treasuries.124  
While QNCs are not directly impacted by Citizens United and its fall-out, they 
provide a mechanism for wealthy individuals to funnel profits made through 
corporate enterprise into politically motivated action groups without ever being 
identified.  According to one report issued in August 2012, two QNCs, 
Crossroads GPS and Americans for Prosperity, spent almost $60 million in 
television-based advertising geared toward the presidential race.125  This figure 
surpassed the spending of even the wealthiest Super PACs.126 
The spending impact of Citizens United is difficult to measure directly due to 
the number of vehicles available to bundle funds.  Moreover, researchers draw 
different conclusions from the same data.  For example, the impact of Citizens 
                                                            
 121. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS’ SOFT MONEY ACCOUNTS SHOW 
NEED FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BILLS: FIRST OF PUBLIC CITIZEN REPORTS ON “527” 
GROUPS REVEALS CORPORATE INFLUENCE ON BROADBAND, TOBACCO AND MONEY-
LAUNDERING POLICIES 1 (2002) (claiming that “serious shortcomings exist in both the [527 
organization] law and the disclosure system”). 
 122. The FEC requires PACs to report on “receipts and disbursements” and PACs “have the 
option to file these reports quarterly or monthly.”  Quick Answers to PAC Questions, supra note 
18. 
 123. Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey, Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), IRS 
(1995), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm95.pdf.  However, the bundling exemption only 
applies to 501(c)(4) organizations if raising campaign funding is not the organization’s sole 
purpose.  Id.  To qualify as a QNC, “the entity must be a nonprofit corporation . . . ideological in 
nature . . . .  If a QNC makes electioneering communications that aggregate in excess of $10,000 
in a calendar year, it must certify that it is eligible for the QNC exemption.”  Electioneering 
Communications, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter Electioneering 
Communications], http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/electioneering.shtml. 
 124. Electioneering Communications, supra note 123. 
 125. Kim Barker, Two Dark Money Groups Outspending All Super PACs Combined, 
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 13, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/two-dark-money-
groups-outspending-all-super-pacs-combined. 
 126. Id.  See also Alicia Budich & Robert Hendin, Non-Profits Outspending Super PACs, CBS 
(Aug. 19, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57496037/non-profits-
outspending-super-pacs/. 
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United is discernable in studies that measure the post-Citizens United difference 
between spending in states that had an existing ban on corporate independent 
political spending and states without such bans.  An increase in states that 
previously limited corporate campaign spending suggests the bans were 
successful in staunching the flow of political dollars.  One study relying on this 
data asserted that “while spending did increase more in the states with a 
prohibition, the fact that a significant increase occurred across both sets [sic] 
tells us that we should be looking for alternative and more complicated 
explanations.”127  However, another study analyzed the same data and found 
independent expenditures more than doubled in the pool of states that previously 
banned independent campaign expenditures.128 
A.  The Impact of Super PACs: Money in the 2012 Political Election 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2012, Super PACs spent 
nearly $65 million on independent expenditures and were major players in more 
than a dozen congressional races.129  At the close of the 2012 election cycle, the 
spending figures were record-breaking.  The Center for Responsive Politics 
revealed that Super PACs had spent $609 million for or against candidates.130  
Corporations, individuals, and other independent groups spent a total of 
$92,821,398.131  The conservative group connected with Karl Rove, American 
Crossroads, organized as a Super PAC, had spent $104,746,670, while its 
affiliate Crossroads GPS, organized as a 501(c)(4), totaled $70,968,744 in 
spending.132  That amount included $213,196 in electioneering 
                                                            
 127. Keith E. Hamm et al., The Impact of Citizens United in the States: Independent Spending 
in State Elections, 2006-2010 6 (Amer. Political Sci. Ass’n Annual Meeting, Working Paper, 2012), 
available-at-http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/State-Indep-Spdg_2006-10_Working-Paper-as-
Released-22October2012.pdf. 
 128. Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical 
Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 361 (2014).  See also Justin Levitt, 
Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 223 (2010) 
(hypothesizing that Citizens United has created “so much sound and fury” because of “[t]he populist 
environment, hostile to generic corporate interests of many kinds”).  Levitt suggests that “the case’s 
aggressive procedural approach, and its sweeping rhetoric, both of which seem to poke a finger in 
the eye of those who disagree with the legal merits” also play a part.  Id. 
 129. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=O&type=S (last updated Nov. 12, 2012). 
 130. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, http://www.open 
secrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, American Crossroads/Crossroads GPS, OPENSECRETS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=American+Crossroads%2FCrossroads+GPS&cycle=2012 (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2014). 
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communication.133  Restore Our Future, Americans for Prosperity, and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, all conservative groups, had spent a total of 
$214,107,293 in efforts to secure a win for conservative candidates.134  The left-
leaning Priorities USA Action group, organized as a Super PAC, had spent 
$65,166,859.135  The Center for Responsive Politics reported that “the 2012 
election will not only be the most expensive election in U.S. history, the cost 
will tower over the next most expensive election by more than $700 million.”136 
By the close of the 2012 presidential election polls, total campaign spending 
was astounding.  Restore Our Future—a Super PAC that backed Republican 
presidential nominee Mitt Romney—was responsible for $142,655,346 of the 
total $631 million spent on independent expenditures by super PACs in the 2012 
election cycle.137  Conservative Super PAC American Crossroads and the 
affiliated 501(c)(4) “social welfare” group Crossroads GPS were second in 
spending, with a total of about $175.8 million.138  Priorities USA Action, a group 
that supported President Barack Obama, spent about $65 million, rounding out 
the top three super PACs.139  This spending was only a portion of the grand total 
likely spent by Super PACs in 2012.  The Center for Responsive Politics notes 
that millions of dollars were spent on political campaign advertisements that ran 
“far enough before [the presidential] election that they [did not] need to be 
reported anywhere.”140 
In mid-August, prior to the election, NBC Nightly News reported more than 
half a billion dollars had been spent on television and radio advertisements 
alone.141  When this total passed the $500 million mark, NBC anchor Brian 
                                                            
 133. Id. 
 134. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, OPENSECRETS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&type=p&disp=O (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for 
Responsive Politics Predicts, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-
election-spending-will-reach-6/ (last-visited-Aug.-12, 2014). 
 137. Independent Spending Totals, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-
finance/independent-expenditures/totals (last visited July 30, 2014); Michelle Martinelli, 
Crossroads’ $175 Million Strikeout, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 8, 2012),-http://www.open 
secrets.org/news/2012/11/despite-dropping-millions-crossroads-strikes-out/. 
 138. See Martinelli, supra note 137 (stating that American Crossroads was responsible for 
$105 million in independent expenditures, and that Crossroads GPS spent $70.8 million). 
 139. Tarini Parti, Priorities USA Thinks about Life after Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2013, 
4:35 PM),-http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/priorities-usa-thinks-about-life-after-obama-
87961-.html. 
 140. Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Shadow Money’s Top 10 Candidates, OPENSECRETS 
(Oct. 25, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/shadow-moneys-top-10-
candidates.html. 
 141. Domenico Montanaro, Political Campaign Ad Spending Tops $500 Million, NBC (Aug. 
16, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/16/13319834-political-
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Williams informed viewers of what else that much money could buy: “[f]ive 
hundred million dollars could feed 9.2 million malnourished children for fifty 
days.  It could immunize 29 million children for life.  It could provide clean 
water for 500 million children for forty days . . . . [I]nstead, it’s buying television 
commercials, and the real general election campaign hasn’t even really started 
yet.”142 Television business news channel CNBC reported in late October 2012 
that, combined, both presidential hopefuls were spending $26.86 per second.143 
All told, campaign spending on messaging in the 2012 Presidential election 
shattered previous records, topping $6 billion dollars.144  Six billion dollars is 
more than the gross domestic product (GDP) of many small countries.145  Thus, 
the amount of money spent during the 2012 presidential election cycle could 
have sustained a small nation for an entire year. 
III.  THE MAKING OF THE “APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION” 
In the Democratic National Committee’s amicus brief to the Citizens United 
case, Robert Bauer, campaign finance counsel to President Obama, predicted 
that removing corporate campaign spending limits would usher in a new era of 
citizen disillusionment.146 Bauer forecasted that eliminating spending 
restrictions would cause the citizenry to believe that their voice would be 
drowned out by the voices of those with the most money.147  This sentiment 
captures the notion that the Citizens United majority tipped the scales in favor 
                                                            
campaign-ad-spending-tops-500-million?lite (noting that in just one week of August 2012, $37 
million dollars went to political advertising). 
 142. NBC Nightly News: 2012 Presidential Campaign Ads Surpass Half-Billion Mark (NBC 
television broadcast Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/ 
16/13319834-political-campaign-ad-spending-tops-500-million?lite. 
 143. Eamon Javers, Here’s How Much Candidates Spend to Get Your Vote, CNBC (Oct. 25, 
2012,-10:16-AM),-http://www.cnbc.com/id/49550998/Here039s_How_Much_Candidates_ 
Spend_to_Get_Your_Vote.  CNBC also reported that Obama and his supporters spent more than 
$775 million “before the crucial election month of October.”  Id. 
 144. Nicholas Confessore & Jess Bidgood, Little to Show for Cash Flood by Big Donors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A1 (explaining that the 2012 election was “[t]he most expensive . . . in 
American history”).  Confessore and Bidgood claim that the election was “propelled by legal and 
regulatory decisions that allowed wealthy donors to pour record amounts of cash into races around 
the country.”  Id. 
 145. For example, in 2012, Fiji’s GDP was $4,035,420,973; Liberia’s was $1,733,828,404; 
Sierra Leone’s was $3,787,392,595; and Barbados’ was $4,224,850,000.  World Bank Search, 
WORLD BANK, http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP&language=EN (follow “GDP 
(current US$)” hyperlink; then type country name into search bar; then scroll to 2012 column).  In 
fact, forty-one countries had GDPs under $6 billion in 2012.  See id. 
 146. Brief for Democratic Nat’l Comm. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 16, 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) (claiming that “[a] sudden change in the 
law, to the advantage of corporate wealth amassed in commercial transactions, would cause a 
violent disruption in [the election] process”). 
 147. Id. 
976 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:953 
of corporate interests and substantially diminished the ability of individual 
Americans to determine election outcomes.148 
A.  Concerns about Money in Political Elections 
Early in 2012, aggregation of wealth and spending came under attack on 
several grounds.  Objections were often explicitly triggered by rising 
consternation about new spending vehicles, but, most fundamentally, the 
arguments were as old as corruption itself.  One prominent concern was that 
groups would inappropriately influence lawmakers by conspicuously spending 
money to elect candidates  who would then vote for legislation benefitting those 
groups.  A second related concern was that the ability of “average” (non-
wealthy) citizens to influence the outcome of elections would decrease.  Much 
of the discussion focused on the potential for money from wealthy donors to 
overwhelm small donors’ contributions such that small donations would simply 
no longer matter.  Thus, these constituencies would become disenchanted and 
disengage from the political process.149 
The uptick in influence of wealthy interests and the dwindling impact of 
average citizens was echoed by a related fear, namely that money, rather than a 
candidate’s qualifications, would select elected officials.  After the 2012 
election, the Center for Responsive Politics reported that better funded 
candidates won 92.7% of House of Representatives races and 63.6% of Senate 
races.150  Although money could be an indication of support, it could also 
                                                            
 148. See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign 
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 174 (2004) 
(noting that the authors found “some support for several alternative hypotheses to the theory that 
improper influences on government generate Americans’ perceptions of corruption[,]” but 
concluding that “large shares of the American population distrust their government and believe the 
campaign finance system is a source of undue influence”). 
 149. This is not a novel concern. More than twenty years ago, one University of California, 
Los Angeles School of Law professor wrote: 
A common way of describing this type of situation is to say that there is an “appearance 
of impropriety.”  While not exactly wrong, discussion of the campaign finance question 
in terms of appearances is misleading. It suggests that there is an underlying reality that 
is either proper or not proper, and if we could only look behind the locked door or, 
perhaps, into the legislator’s head, we would know.  Used as a rationale for reform 
measures, the argument is that the appearance of impropriety is a sufficient justification 
for reform, because it undermines popular confidence in government. Depending on who 
is speaking and who is listening, there may be an implied wink to the effect that 
impropriety is really very unlikely but that some sop must be thrown to the ignorantly 
suspicious public. Alternatively, the implied wink may suggest that of course there is 
impropriety, but it would be impolitic to say so directly. 
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 326 (1989). 
 150. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Blue Team Aided by Small Donors, Big Bundlers; Huge 
Outside Spending Still Comes Up Short, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 7, 2012, 7:38 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/post-election.html. 
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represent backing by disproportionately wealthy interests, such as the oil, 
technology, or pharmaceuticals industries. 
Objections did not come from outside observers alone.  Lawmakers 
themselves were vocal about the negative consequences of unlimited interest 
group spending.  When Charles Roemer, former Louisiana governor and 
congressman, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he warned that: 
Washington DC [sic] is not just broken.  It is bought, rented, leased, 
owned by the money givers. Special interests, the bundlers, PACs, 
Super PACs, lobbyists, the Wall Street bankers, the pharmaceuticals, 
the corporate giants, the insurance companies, organized labor, the 
GSE’s [sic] like Fannie and Freddie, energy companies, on and on and 
on and on. And this is not about one party versus the other, or about 
one person or another.  It is about systemic and institutional corruption 
where the size of your check rather than the strength of your need or 
idea determine your place in line.151 
During the same hearing, Professor Lawrence Lessig noted that in the 2012 
election cycle only 196 citizens funded eighty percent of Super PAC 
spending.152  Lessig told lawmakers that “elected [officials] are dependent upon 
the tiniest slice of America, yet that tiny slice is in no way representative of the 
rest of America.”153  Lessig concluded that the situation he described was 
corrupt.154 
B.  Availability of Information and Creating Appearance of Corruption 
The American public agrees with Lessig.  As one academic noted: “If limits 
on contributions are permissible only in times and places where wide segments 
of the public believe that special interests exert too much influence over politics, 
then they are permissible in all times and places.  The public always believes 
this, and it always will.”155  Television, print, and web-based media provide 
much of the publicly available information about the role of money in elections.  
Because money’s influence on politics is controversial, and controversy sells, 
news outlets regularly report on political election spending.  Television and print 
                                                            
 151. Taking Back Our Democracy Hearing, supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Charles Roemer, 
former Congressman and Governor of Louisiana). 
 152. Id. at 72 (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Harvard Law School). 
 153. Id. at 77. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Ronald M. Levin, Fighting the Appearance of Corruption, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 171, 
177 (2001) (noting that Levin is opposed to considering appearances in the crafting of campaign 
finance regulation). 
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media tout segments like Keeping Them Honest,156 Fact Check,157 and Political 
Hotsheet,158 all of which are designed to reveal little-known information.  
ProPublica tallies PAC and Super PAC contributions and tracks how much 
money they use to support or oppose political candidates.159  The Center for 
Responsive Politics allows visitors to search individual or company donations 
and keeps a current list of interest group contributions.160  Websites like 
FactCheck161 (unrelated to the New York Times sidebar companion referenced 
above) and OpenSecrets162 are dedicated to divulging facts behind controversial 
topics so American citizens receive campaign finance information.  As a result, 
election dollars influence how the public views the political campaign process.  
For example, following the July 2012 defeat of the DISCLOSE Act,163 CNN 
reported that almost 700 independent political groups donated more than $187 
million to the 2012 campaigns nationwide.164 
In 2012, in addition to increased media reports on campaign spending, 
Americans witnessed a dramatic increase in political advertising, most of which 
went to television commercials.  Approximately 730,000 advertisements aired 
in the five months prior to the 2008 election.165  Comparatively, in the five 
months prior to the 2012 election, 1,015,615 political television advertisements 
ran, representing a thirty-nine percent increase over the 2008 figure.166  The 
                                                            
 156. See, e.g., AC360º: Keeping Them Honest: Where Did $40 Million in Charity Donations 
Go? (CNN television broadcast Feb. 10, 2014). 
 157. See, e.g., Fact-Checking de Blasio vs. Lhota: Round 1, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/news/2013-10-15-first-mayoral-debate/ (illustrating a New York Times 
sidebar companion to coverage of campaign debates in which candidates’ claims are vetted). 
 158. See, e.g., Politics, CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/politics/ (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 159. See, e.g., Al Shaw & Kim Barker, PAC Track: What and Where are the Super PACs 
Spending?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2012), http://projects.propublica.org/pactrack/#committee=all. 
160.See,-e.g.,-Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2010-Outside-Spending,-by-Super-PAC, 
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V& 
disp=O&type=S (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 161. See, e.g., FACTCHECK, http://www.factcheck.org/ (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 162. See,-e.g.,-Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Our-Mission:-Inform,-Empower-&-Advocate,-
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/about/ (last visited July 31, 2014) (noting that the site 
is dedicated to compiling statistics and reporting on lobbying and political donation activities). 
 163. See Paul Blumenthal, DISCLOSE Campaign Spending Act Blocked by Senate 
Republicans, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012, 8:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/07/16/disclose-act-senate-campaign-spending_n_1678055.html.  Senate Republicans 
blocked the DISCLOSE Act, as the 51-44 vote fell seven short of the required sixty needed to 
overcome the GOP filibuster.  Id.  The DISCLOSE Act would require groups spending more than 
$10,000 during an election cycle to identify donors of more than $10,000.  Id. 
 164. Halimah Abdullah & Matt Smith, Outside Political Donors Still Shrouded in Smoke, CNN 
(July 18, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/18/politics/campaign-finance/index.html. 
 165. Dan Eggen, Obama Campaign Has Spent More on Ads Than Romney’s, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 2, 2012, 1:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/11/02/ 
romney-campaign-ads-outnumber-obama-ads-in-final-stretch/. 
 166. Id. 
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Wesleyan Media Project provided the analysis, and upon reviewing the results, 
co-director Erika Fowler commented: “‘Everyone expected ads to be more 
abundant this election than in 2008, especially with super PAC involvement and 
both candidates opting out of public funding, but passing the one million mark 
is a real milestone.’”167 
C.  Empirical Polling Data Regarding Citizen Perceptions 
As Americans became more aware of the impact of Citizens United, the 
potential for perception of corruption increases.  In fact, the public currently 
evinces a groundswell of opposition to corporate campaign spending, suggesting 
citizens are already noticing Citizen United’s effects.168 
1.  Polling before Citizens United 
Americans expressed concern about corruption in government long before 
Citizens United.  For example, during the 2008 primary election, Gallup 
conducted a poll on the “[i]mportance of [c]andidates’ [p]ositions on [e]ach 
[i]ssue in [i]nfluencing Americans’ [v]ote for President.”169  Of those polled, 
seventy-nine percent rated a presidential candidate’s position on government 
corruption “extremely/very important.”170  Interestingly, poll-takers ranked 
government corruption a higher concern than terrorism, Social Security, 
Medicare, and taxes.171  In February 2010, Gallup conducted another poll, asking 
“[w]hat are the one or two weaknesses of the United States that make you most 
pessimistic about the future of the country over the next [twenty] years?”172  
Those polled rated poor governance the United States’ biggest weakness.173 
An empirical study that examined polling data immediately prior to Citizens 
United found “strong support” among almost half of respondents for the 
assertion that “[c]andidates who run for federal offices should only be allowed 
to spend money funded through a public financing system.  No individual or 
political action committee contributions [s]hould be allowed.”174  Almost 
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 168. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 169. Lydia Saad, Iraq and the Economy Are Top Issues to Voters, GALLUP (Feb. 13, 2008), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/104320/Iraq-Economy-Top-Issues-Voters.aspx. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (demonstrating that those polled consider only terrorism and Social Security to be of 
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 172. Lydia Saad, One in Three Cite “American People” as Key U.S. Asset, GALLUP (Feb. 17, 
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 173. Id. 
 174. Abby K. Blass, Brian E. Roberts & Daron R. Shaw, ‘Pay to Play’ or ‘Money for Nothing’? 
Americans’ Assessment of Money and the Efficacy of the Political System (Sept. 2010) 
(unpublished meeting paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1644346. 
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seventy percent strongly supported the statement, “[f]ree and equal airtime on 
television should be available for candidates.”175  However, political corruption 
tied as the second most important issue facing America along with a balanced 
budget and education (and after unemployment).176  However, respondents also 
ranked campaign spending second-to-last on the list of priorities. 177  That 
respondents were simultaneously worried about corruption in government and 
unconcerned about campaign spending suggests they perceived little connection 
between the two. 
2.  Polling after Citizens United 
Following Citizens United, the public’s view shifted.  An April 2012 poll 
revealed that Americans infer a connection between campaign spending and 
corruption.178  The poll suggests Americans fear that Super PACs and corporate 
interests influence elected officials, and that this fear may influence voter 
behavior.179  According to the survey, conducted by the Brennan Center for 
Justice at the New York University School of Law, Americans believe that 
money spent on a politician’s campaign impacts how that politician later 
votes.180  More than two-thirds of all respondents “agreed that a company that 
spent $100,000 to help elect a member of Congress could successfully pressure 
him or her to change a vote on proposed legislation.”181  Republicans and 
Democrats equally supported the notion.182  Further, seventy-seven percent of 
all respondents thought members of Congress would put the interests of groups 
that spent millions on their campaigns before the public’s interests.183  Both 
Republicans and Democrats also agreed with this idea.184 
Other recent polls tell a similar story.  A January 2012 New York Times poll 
asked: “Which one of the following two positions on campaign financing do you 
favor more: limiting the amount of money individuals can contribute to political 
campaigns, or allowing individuals to contribute as much money to political 
campaigns as they’d like?”185  Almost two-thirds of respondents favored limiting 
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political advertising spending.186  Similarly, more than two-thirds favored 
restricting how much groups can spend independently on political campaigns.187  
A March 2012 Washington Post telephone poll found nearly seven in ten 
registered voters would support banning Super PACs; of that seven in ten, more 
than half strongly felt that Super PACs should be illegal.188  Only twenty-five 
percent said Super PACs “should remain legal.”189  In June 2012, Clarus 
Research Group for Common Good, a nonpartisan government reform coalition, 
conducted a survey that found that “[fifty-seven] percent of American voters 
think the current system of financing political campaigns doesn’t work.”190  The 
poll numbers, published in The Atlantic, also reveal that eighty percent of those 
polled believe members of Congress are more interested in re-election than 
improving the campaign finance system.191  Almost nine out of ten respondents 
agreed that public disclosure of campaign contributions should be mandatory, 
and three-quarters of respondents supported a constitutional amendment to limit 
presidential and congressional campaign spending.192 
A more recent poll, commissioned by the Corporate Reform Coalition, studied 
“Americans’ attitudes toward corporate political spending.”193  Published in 
October 2012, the poll found that eighty-nine percent of Americans agree that 
“there is way too much corporate money in politics]” and fifty-one percent 
strongly agreed.194  Seventy percent of those polled believe that banning 
corporate-funded political ads would improve American politics, and more than 
half advocated “a Constitutional amendment to ban all corporate political 
spending.”195  Eighty-four percent of poll-takers agreed that corporate political 
spending stifles the average American’s voice, and eighty-three percent “believe 
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that corporations and corporate CEOs have too much political power.”196  
Similarly, most Americans agreed that corporate political spending negatively 
impacts federal politics and increases congressional corruption.197  Poll-takers 
expressed similar concerns about state politics; eighty percent agreed that 
corporate funding negatively impacts state campaigns and politics, and seventy-
eight percent believe this influence corrupts state politics.198  Finally, the 
Corporate Reform Coalition poll demonstrates Americans are prepared to take 
action consistent with their professed concerns.199  Seventy-nine percent of those 
polled would protest corporate political spending by refusing to patronize a 
particular company.200  Sixty-five percent would sell a politically active 
company’s stock, and a majority would take other steps to avoid investing in the 
company.201  Fifty-two percent of those polled would demand disclosure at the 
company’s stockholder meeting, and seventy-five percent would petition the 
SEC for corporate disclosure.202 
These findings are powerful evidence that current campaign finance laws fail 
to address the appearance of corruption.  The growing cynicism of the American 
public and corresponding evidence that voter cynicism influences voter behavior 
is particularly concerning.  Citizen distrust of the democratic process threatens 
the health of our democracy. 
IV.  WHY APPEARANCE MATTERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEPTIONS OF 
CORRUPTION 
Although Supreme Court campaign finance opinions historically focus on 
actual corruption, the Court acknowledges that appearance of corruption is 
problematic.  The Court has expressed a willingness to consider public 
perception.  The Court manifests a belief that appearances matter in two ways: 
(1) directly, by explicitly referencing the concern in dicta; and (2) indirectly, 
through the type of evidence it considers relevant in making determinations. 
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A.  The Court’s View of Appearance of Corruption 
The Court characterizes avoiding the appearance of corruption as a 
compelling interest in all of its major campaign finance decisions, including 
Buckley, McConnell, Austin, and Citizens United.203  Even the SpeechNow.org 
Court noted that the Court historically interpreted the definition of corruption 
broadly enough to encompass the appearance of “‘undue influence’ created by 
large donations given for the purpose of ‘buying access.’”204  The 
SpeechNow.org opinion cited the Court’s earlier reticence about adopting a pure 
quid pro quo definition of corruption.205  Though Citizens United narrowed that 
definition,206 the Court never wavered from its perspective that the appearance 
of corruption is dangerous.  The Buckley opinion maintained that the appearance 
of corruption is almost as dangerous as actual corruption, and must be avoided 
to maintain citizens’ confidence in the government.207  Maintaining citizens’ 
confidence was a vital governmental interest when Buckley was decided in 1976, 
and it remains one today. 
However, “[t]he issue is whether . . . [that] governmental interest [is] 
compelling enough to justify restricting . . . speech that causes the appearance 
[of corruption].”208  In evaluating the balance between governmental interest and 
freedom of speech, the judiciary historically accepted empirical evidence of 
citizen perception.  For example, in Daggett v. Commission on Governmental 
Ethics,209 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that seventy 
percent of one survey’s respondents believed campaign contributions cause 
political corruption, and that new limits on contributions would bolster faith in 
the democratic process.210  In Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman,211 the 
Ninth Circuit considered polls showing that nearly seventy-nine percent of 
Montana voters thought money was “synonymous with power” and that sixty-
nine percent of Montanans believed “elected officials [gave] special treatment” 
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to large contributors.212  In Homans v. City of Albuquerque,213 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit contemplated a poll demonstrating that city voters 
believed federal elections, which had no spending limits, were more susceptible 
to special interest influence than local elections, to which spending limits 
applied.214  Courts take heed of data about citizen perceptions because 
“[a]ttitudes toward the processes of government, as apart from the policies, 
constitute an important, free-standing variable that has serious implications for 
the health of democracy.”215  Harvard Law School professor Mark Warren has 
written: 
[C]orruption undermines the culture of democracy. When people lose 
confidence that public decisions are taken for reasons that are publicly 
available and justifiable, they become cynical about public speech and 
deliberation.  People come to expect duplicity in public speech . . . .  
And when people are mistrustful of government, they are also cynical 
about their own capacities to act on public goods and purposes . . . .  
Finally, corruption undermines democratic capacities of association 
within civil society by generalizing suspicion and eroding trust and 
reciprocity.216 
As Justice Stevens pointed out, “‘the cynical assumption that large donors call 
the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance.’”217  Ultimately, the cost to democracy is the refusal of citizens to 
participate. Warren argues that democracies necessarily involve mistrust 
because they are rife with political conflict, and political actors’ interests are not 
always in sync with those of their constituents.218  He believes that: 
In aggregate, candidates engaged in spending races need to rely on a 
relatively wealthy class of people and interest groups who, in 
aggregate, have interests that differ from the less wealthy.  Under these 
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circumstances, the public is justified in inferring improper influences 
from high levels of privately-financed spending in itself.219 
The belief that wealthy interests dictate which candidates win elections erodes 
confidence in the democratic process and undermines the American people’s 
sense that they play a meaningful role in selecting the men and women who 
govern.  Ultimately, citizens lose faith in their ability to be politically 
efficacious. 
B.  Political Efficacy Research 
The link between perception of corruption and breakdown of participatory 
democracy is best viewed through the lens of “political efficacy.”  “Political 
efficacy” describes both an individual’s ability to understand political issues in 
order to participate in politics, and an individual’s beliefs about government 
responsiveness to citizen input.220  Contemporary work in political efficacy is 
informed by two social psychology lines of work regarding self-efficacy.  One 
line of work describes self-efficacy as motivational, characterized by an effort 
to influence events and outcomes.221  The other relates to a cognitive view of 
efficacy, and focuses on the degree to which an individual anticipates and 
perceives control over her environment.222  As Albert Bandura wrote: “Unless 
people believe they can produce desired effects by their actions they have little 
incentive to act.  Efficacy belief is, therefore, the foundation of action.”223 
Political efficacy is the manifestation of a particular form of personal and 
collective influence.  This form of efficacy is generally realized early in life, 
long before meaningful political input is possible.  Researchers find that children 
form a basic sense of political efficacy as early as third grade.224  Although 
children grasp political efficacy early, one’s views on political efficacy can 
change over the course of a lifetime. 
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An individual’s investment of time or money in political campaigns often 
increases internal political efficacy.225  Internal efficacy is an individual’s 
personal assessment of how much power or influence she has on political 
outcomes.  External efficacy represents a general evaluation of political 
institutions’ willingness to receive input from all individuals in society.  One 
study found high investment activities are more likely to increase efficacy than 
low investment activities, but both high and low investment activities increase 
voters’ sense of power over the political process.226  Another study observed the 
connection between corruption and democracy globally, finding that citizens of 
democracies with higher levels of corruption reported lower levels of 
satisfaction with the performance of their political systems and trust in public 
servants.227 
Empirical findings suggest political efficacy is important because the more 
internal efficacy a citizen experiences, the more likely she is to vote and engage 
in other forms of societal participation.228  An early study reported that an 
individual’s feeling of political efficacy relates to other measures of power in 
society, such as income level.229  The study’s authors found large variations 
between racial and income groups regarding political participation.230  The study 
asked respondents to report the number of elections in which they had voted 
since they were eligible to vote.231  The authors reported that “[t]he distribution 
of their responses followed exactly the income-race hierarchy: almost nine-
tenths of the rich indicated they had always voted, followed by the middle-
income whites, middle-income blacks, poor whites, and poor blacks in that order 
. . . .”232   The relationship between political efficacy and participation is self-
perpetuating.  Feelings of efficacy increase likelihood of voting or volunteering 
time or money,233 and one’s level of participation, in turn, influences the degree 
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to which a citizen feels efficacious.234  Research has demonstrated the 
correlation between involvement in campaigns and the perception of efficacy.235  
Individuals who believe that they can effect change through participation in 
politics tend to be actively involved in politics, while those who perceive that 
political institutions and processes are unresponsive to them, become politically 
apathetic.236  As discussed above, Buckley mandated regulating the “appearance 
of corruption” because corruption creates a lack of trust in government, thus 
discouraging people from participating.237 
Voting is the most basic and prevalent way Americans participate in political 
life.  History demonstrates that Americans’ perception of corruption affects their 
voting behaviors.  For example, citizens are less likely to vote following political 
scandal.  During the 1976 presidential election, with memories of Watergate still 
fresh, four million fewer people voted than did in 1972.238  The growing 
perception that increased independent spending by PACs and corporations leads 
to corruption similarly influences citizens’ participation in elections.  A report 
by the Brennan Center for Justice stated that “[a]n alarming number of 
Americans report that their concerns about the influence of donors to outside 
political groups make them less likely to engage in democracy.”239  According 
to the report, sixty-five percent of Americans lack faith in government because 
of the power held by Super PACs compared to the average voter.240  Republicans 
and Democrats nearly equally exhibited this concern.241  However, the Brennan 
Center’s most concerning discovery was that twenty-six percent of Americans 
claim they are less likely to vote because of the unequal influence big donors 
have over elected officials through contributions to Super PACs.242  Another 
study completed by Common Cause Minnesota examined the impact of 
campaign contributions on the perception of corruption and desire to participate 
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in politics.243  One-third of respondents asserted they are now less likely to 
participate in politics because they believe those who donate to Super PACs 
influence the political process unfairly.244 
Perceptions of corruption also influence attitudes towards lawmakers and 
political parties.  Americans who believe their government is corrupt tend to 
attribute that corruption to the party in control of the presidency, regardless of 
whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the White House.245  Hence, 
perceptions can systematically undercut faith in the executive.  Moreover, 
individual candidates are more vulnerable on Election Day if they campaign 
during a period when Americans perceive increased government corruption.246  
This is true even for candidates who are innocent of suspicious activity.  In other 
words, even an air of corruption casts a pall over all lawmakers and influences 
global judgments about government.  Perhaps for this reason, the problem of 
fundraising and campaign spending has become a familiar theme on Capitol Hill, 
and in the American political discourse.  As Lessig testified, politicians who are 
“forced into a cycle of perpetual fundraising, . . . become, or at least most 
Americans believe [they] become, responsive to the will of the funders.”247 
V.  THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND THE OBAMA CAMPAIGN 
Given the rising cost of political elections and a growing dissatisfaction with 
government, the 2012 election cycle could have marked the beginning of a 
significant downturn in citizen engagement.  However, some characteristics of 
the election, particularly Barack Obama’s campaign, may have muted the 
influence of burgeoning campaign spending.  Specifically, Obama’s campaign 
strategy of personally engaging voters demonstrates the importance of political 
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efficacy and provides insight into how candidates can run successful campaigns 
during the Citizens United era. 
A.  Evidence of an Efficacy-Action Connection: The Backdrop to Obama’s 
Success in 2012 
Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential election is a case study of the relationship 
between voters’ feelings of political efficacy and their political engagement.  
Obama’s 2008 campaign tactics revolutionized the way candidates reach voters.  
His campaign utilized social media; his messages were personal, emotional, and 
designed to instill a sense of self-power in their audience.  One study of 2008 
voters reported that “both internal and external efficacy [were] positively related 
to a vote for Barack Obama in the 2008 election, suggesting that he was able to 
appeal to those who were more optimistic about their political influence.”248  
Research also shows a connection between emotional appeals and political 
involvement.249  The authors of one study found that “candidates who appeal to 
voters through the use of emotions are rewarded with increased support across a 
range of different types of participation.”250  Hence, it is unsurprising that 
Obama’s direct appeals increased participation.  In fact, sixty-two percent of 
voters participated in the 2008 election, a level not seen since the 1950s and 
60s.251  He outpaced all other presidential candidates in the primary season in 
                                                            
 248. Southwell, supra note 225, at 12. 
 249. Philip Edward Jones, Lindsay H. Hoffman & Dannagal G. Young, Online Emotional 
Appeals and Political Participation: The Effect of Candidate Affect on Mass Behavior, 15 NEW 
MEDIA & SOC’Y. 1132, 1143 (2012). 
 250. Id. at 1133. 
 251. Michael P. McDonald, The Return of the Voter: Voter Turnout in the 2008 Presidential 
Election, 6 FORUM, 1, 1 (2008).  See also AM. UNIV. NEWS, AFRICAN-AMERICANS, ANGER, FEAR 
AND YOUTH PROPEL TURNOUT TO HIGHEST LEVEL SINCE 1960 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.american.edu/spa/cdem/upload/2008pdfoffinaledited.pdf (noting that 2008 voter 
turnout was also “the third highest turnout since women were given the right to vote in 1920”).  
Significantly, Obama “rais[ed] an unprecedented amount of cash from small donors who helped 
him shatter fundraising records.”  Kenneth P. Vogel, The Myth of the Small Donor, POLITICO (Aug. 
7, 2012, 4:27 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/79421.html.  In fact, one-third of 
Obama’s 2008 campaign contributions came from small donors.  Press Release, Campaign Fin. 
Inst., All CFI Funding Statistics Revised and Updated for the 2008 Presidential Primary and Gen. 
Election Candidates: New Figures Show that Obama Raised About One-Third of His Gen. Election 
Funds from Donors Who Gave $200 Or Less; Obama’s Gen. Election Money From Small Donors 
Alone Exceeded McCain’s Pub. Funding Grant (Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release, 
Campaign-Fin.-Inst.],-available-at-http://www.cfinst.org/press/releases_tags/10-01-08/Revised-
_and_Updated_2008_Presidential_Statistics.aspx.  Obama’s fundraising efforts were particularly 
important because he was the first candidate, and the only in the 2008 presidential election, to refuse 
public funds for the general campaign.  Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Forgoes Public 
Funds-in-First-for-Major-Candidate,-N.Y.-TIMES,-June-20,-2008,-http://www.nytimes.com-
/2008/06/20/us/politics/20obamacnd.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1407873711/m8+cOBBeGk38f1
YbObvOg. 
990 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:953 
small donor donations, receiving almost half of all donations less than $200.252  
In the general election, the percentage of donations from small donors rose to 
thirty-four percent.253  While the 2008 correlation between a historically high 
number of small donations and reports of feelings of high political efficacy is 
not conclusive, it does suggest that when average individuals perceive their 
contributions are making a difference in a political campaign, they have a greater 
sense of ownership and involvement in the election.  Moreover, political efficacy 
research lends support to the notion that 2008 Obama voters felt “greater internal 
political efficacy than both McCain voters and nonvoters.”254 
B.  What Happened in 2012? 
The run-up to the 2012 presidential and congressional elections made two 
things seem clear.  First, the amount of money spent on political elections is 
growing quickly.  Second, to the extent that American citizens are paying 
attention, they are unhappy about the trend and perceive negative consequences.  
Social science suggests the rapid growth of campaign spending and 
accompanying public anxiety may usher in a new era of disillusionment and 
disengagement from the political process.  So, does the 2012 election cycle 
reveal evidence of a troubled democracy?  All in all, the 2012 results were 
inconclusive.  On the one hand, individuals committed to a particular candidate 
or political party donated and volunteered in greater numbers.  On the other 
hand, voter turn-out was lower than in the past two presidential elections.  
Notably, the extraordinary success of the 2012 Obama campaign’s “Get Out the 
Vote” (GOTV) efforts likely prevented an even more substantial downturn in 
citizen participation. 
1.  Small Donations and Volunteering Were Up 
Small donor activity in 2012 is measurable by looking at web-based and other 
Democratic fundraising efforts, because those activities were pivotal in the 2008 
election cycle.  In the months leading up to the 2012 election, the Democrats’ 
congressional fundraising arms experienced record success with small donors, 
surpassing their 2008 numbers.  Contributions to the Democratic Congressional 
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Campaign Committee (DCCC) of $200 or less totaled $21.5 million.255  
Similarly, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) 
experienced an eighteen percent increase in donations from small contributors, 
with donations rising “from $10.7 million through the first [eleven] months of 
2009 to $12.6 million during the same period in 2011.”256  However, as was true 
in 2008, the Democrats had the most success in the realm of 2012 small-donor 
fundraising.257  As one observer put it: “[i]n raising money from those giving 
less than $200, Obama is a major league slugger while Romney is still waiting 
to be called up from the minor leagues.  And that has made an enormous 
difference to the campaigns’ bottom lines.”258 
Democratic volunteer numbers were also strong in 2012.  Days before the 
election, Obama’s campaign manager, Jim Messina, announced the existence of 
5,100 GOTV stations in battleground states.  About 700,000 volunteers 
committed to assist the Obama campaign’s GOTV effort.  In July 2012, a 
Huffington Post article noted that in a time of record-low confidence in the 
federal government, the 2012 election volunteers were outliers of the American 
electorate.259 
Many experts estimate that the 2012 Obama campaign was an aberration.260  
In a substantially closer race, turnout was a vital part of the strategy, and on 
Election Day 2012, the Democrats’ turnout efforts were impressive (perhaps 
even historic).261  The month before the election, the Obama campaign released 
a memo in which it reported it registered 1,792,261 voters in key battleground 
states, a figure that represented a nearly one-hundred percent increase in voter 
registration over Obama campaign registrations in 2008.262  CNN reported that 
“[t]he . . . voter contacts the Obama team claimed were more than twice the 
Republican total . . . .  The hundreds of Democratic field offices outnumbered 
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GOP outposts by greater than 2-1 or 3-1 in key swing states.”263  In early 
November, a memorandum from the Obama camp “claim[ed] that the campaign 
ha[d] made 125,646,479 personal phone calls or visits.”264  That number 
represented contact with one out of every 2.5 people in the U.S. population.265  
That figure also dwarfed the 50 million voter contacts the Romney campaign 
has claimed, particularly given that the Romney total also included mailers left 
at voters’ doors.266  Susan Page of USA Today observed that “Obama’s campaign 
[was] spending millions of dollars on the most elaborate field operation in U.S. 
political history, aimed at delivering both core supporters and reluctant ones to 
the polls.”267 
Obama’s well-publicized strategy led to Romney redoubling his campaign 
efforts.  In early November, the Romney campaign stepped up efforts to keep 
early polling from leaving the Republican presidential candidate behind, as it 
did with John McCain in 2008.268  In early November 2012, CBS reported that 
the NRCC was hyping an aggressive early campaign strategy that included a 
plan to make two million contacts on election day269 and open more field offices 
in battleground states.270 
2.  Voter Turnout Was Down 
Despite the candidates’ efforts, 2012 voter turnout was lower than in the past 
two presidential contests.271  A Center for the Study of the American Electorate 
and the Bipartisan Policy Center report “put 2012 voter turnout at 57.5% of all 
eligible voters, compared to 62.3% who voted in 2008 and 60.4% who cast 
ballots in 2004.”272  An estimated 126 million people voted in the 2012 election, 
                                                            
 263. Rebecca Sinderbrand, Analysis: Obama Won with a Better Ground Game, CNN (Nov. 7, 
2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/analysis-why-obama-won. 
 264. Stein, supra note 262. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Page, supra note 29. 
 268. Madison, supra note 28. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Alex Sanz, Obama, Romney Campaigns Step Up Florida Ground Operations, WPTV 
(Oct. 24, 2012, 7:18 PM),-http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/political/obama-romney-campaigns-
step-up-florida-ground-operations. 
 271. Election Results 2012: Voter Turnout Lower Than 2008 and 2004, Report Says, ABC 
(Nov. 8, 2012, 3:21 PM) [hereinafter Election Results 2012], http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/ 
national/election-results-2012-voter-turnout-lower-than-2008-and-2004-report-
says#ixzz2KRzUf4c3. 
 272. Id.  Some groups turned out in greater numbers.  For example, record numbers of Latinos 
turned out to vote and chose President Obama by a wide margin.  Julia Preston & Fernanda Santos, 
A Record Latino Turnout, Solidly Backing Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, at P13.  The New 
York Times reported that “[o]ver all, according to exit polls . . . , Mr. Obama won [seventy-one] 
percent of the Hispanic vote while Mitt Romney won [twenty-seven] percent.”  Id. 
2014] Financing Elections and "Appearance of Corruption" 993 
meaning that 93 million eligible voters did not go to the polls.273  In fact, with 
the exception of Iowa and Louisiana, the 2012 turnout of eligible voters 
decreased from 2008 levels in every state and the District of Columbia.274  Curtis 
Gans, director of American University’s Center for the Study of the American 
Electorate, concluded that: “Beyond the people with passion, we have a 
disengaged electorate.”275  Surveys of non-voters support this conclusion.  In a 
poll conducted by Suffolk University and USA Today, fifty-four percent of 
eligible voters that refrained from voting in 2012 described politics as 
“corrupt.”276  Gans was pessimistic about future voter turnout trends, lamenting 
that the people lack faith and trust in political leaders and institutions.277 
3.  What Obama’s 2012 Success and Low Voter Turnout Tells Us 
The uncommon success of the Obama campaign in getting voters to the polls 
likely disguised what would have been an even more significant downturn in 
voting among American citizens.  Although the 2008 and 2012 Obama 
campaigns moved the art of campaigning into the twenty-first century, whether 
the success of the Obama campaign can be duplicated remains to be seen.  Part 
of President Obama’s strength as a campaigner was his ability to connect with 
voters by evoking in them a sense of personal efficacy; that factor helped propel 
him to victory in 2008 and 2012.  A combination of the Obama campaigns’ 
unique ability to engage voters and the historic significance of the Obama 
presidency make it likely that depressed voter turnout will continue because 
those factors are not easily replicable.  While 131 million people voted in the 
2008 presidential election, only about 129 million people voted in the 2012 
election.278  That difference of 2 million voters may have been substantially 
larger absent the unique features of the 2012 election. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
By allowing unlimited corporate campaign spending, the Citizens United 
Court left an indelible footprint on American politics.  The opinion was less 
notable for its immediate impact than for its symbolic significance and the door 
it opened for the creation of Super PACs capable of amassing large sums to 
spend on political communication.  Much debate centers on the opinion’s 
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legitimacy and the desirability of its effects.279  However, little attention is given 
to its potential to shape Americans’ attitudes about the political election process.  
Whether the trigger was the publicity Citizens United received, the controversy 
surrounding Super PACs, or simply a growing distaste for the proliferation of 
campaign ads, Americans are expressing record levels of dissatisfaction with the 
current state of campaign financing.280 
Opponents of Citizens United propose liberal disclosure rules.  The 
DISCLOSE Act, passed in the House of Representatives but filibustered in the 
Senate, may return in some form, particularly if the American public exhibits 
sustained dissatisfaction with the post-Citizens United situation.  Of course, 
many consider the notion that disclosure is a complete panacea naïve.281  Even 
assuming source of funding disclosure is the perfect solution to combat actual 
corruption, the appearance problem persists.  Although having access to donor 
lists may reassure some citizens, this information may have counterproductive 
effects.  Measures to combat actual corruption, such as liberal disclosure of 
campaign funding, may worsen the appearance of corruption problem.  The 
more American people know about the extent of financial might exercised by 
extremely wealthy individuals and groups with easily identifiable agendas, the 
more likely it is Americans will deem their government corrupt.  As this Article 
illustrates, a widespread loss of confidence in the political system has serious 
negative repercussions.  With perfect disclosure and maximum benefit from 
disclosure—namely complete accountability—we could eliminate actual 
corruption while leaving intact a robust perception of corruption.282  This 
conundrum has no easy escape, save restoring campaign finance laws to their 
pre-Citizens United state. 
In Citizens United, the Court put an exclamation point on its previous rejection 
of a “level playing field” rationale for campaign funding regulations.283  Whether 
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or not Americans have read the case, or even understand the reasoning, its effects 
are palpable.  Polls reveal that many Americans are concluding that the political 
election process is corrupt.284  Further, they believe that they are losing their 
voice, and that wealthy interests are hijacking political elections.285  As one 
commentator put it, “[i]t is no wonder . . . that an egalitarian vision of democratic 
politics is lacking in the United States.  The U.S. Supreme Court has made it 
impossible to articulate such a vision.”286  In Shrink Missouri, Justice Breyer 
articulated reforms that would “seek to build public confidence in the [election] 
process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, 
encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the First 
Amendment itself presupposes.”287  So long as Super PAC spending dominates 
the political campaign scene, that vision will never be realized, and increasing 
numbers of Americans will stay home on Election Day. 
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